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CONSIDERING WHICH LABOR TERMS A DEBTOR MAY
IMPOSE ON ITS UNION AFTER REJECTING A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT UNDER § 1113

ABSTRACT
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code provides courts with a comprehensive
set of criteria for determining when chapter 11 debtors can reject collective
bargaining agreements during bankruptcy. When courts approve rejection,
however, § 1113 and the rest of the Code are silent about which labor terms
debtors may unilaterally impose on their unions. On the rare occasions when
courts and the National Labor Relations Board have addressed this issue, they
have followed one of two approaches. The first approach limits debtors to
imposing only labor terms found in their “last, best offer” to unions before
filing a § 1113 motion. The second approach, however, permits debtors to
impose any labor terms found in any pre-§ 1113 proposals, subject to court
approval.
This Comment argues that courts should follow the second approach. The
post-§ 1113 scenario when debtors unilaterally impose labor terms is
equivalent to the nonbankruptcy scenario of bargain to impasse when
employers are permitted to impose terms from any pre-impasse proposals.
Applying a similar approach to the post-§ 1113 scenario would enable courts
to act consistently in each case. Limiting the terms that a debtor may impose to
those of its “last, best offer” would encourage undesirable behavior by the
employer, including negotiating in bad faith, failing to meet with the union at
reasonable times, and engaging in unlawful surface bargaining. Finally, under
the two most commonly applied models of negotiation, the likelihood of the
parties reaching a negotiated agreement is higher if debtors have flexibility to
impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) lays out guidelines for
courts to follow in evaluating whether to permit debtors to reject collective
bargaining agreements during bankruptcy.1 After an employer files for chapter
11, but before filing a § 1113 motion to reject a collective bargaining
agreement, the Code requires the debtor to negotiate with its union in an effort
to reach a modified collective bargaining agreement that averts the need to
completely reject the existing agreement.2 If those negotiations fail, courts may
approve rejection of a collective bargaining agreement if the debtor satisfies
the requirements found in § 1113.3 While the Code guides courts in approving
rejection, it is silent about which labor terms debtors may impose on their
unions following rejection.4
Courts and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) have utilized
two different approaches when determining which labor terms a debtor may
unilaterally impose on its union after rejecting a collective bargaining
agreement. One approach, friendly towards organized labor, is to limit the
permissible terms to only those found in the debtor’s “last, best offer” to its
union before receiving court approval to reject the existing agreement.5 A
second approach, friendly towards employers, is to permit the debtor to impose
any labor terms found in any proposal made to the union during the mandatory
pre-§ 1113 negotiations, including those found in its initial § 1113 proposal.6
This Comment argues that the second approach giving debtors broad
latitude to impose any labor term from any pre-§ 1113 proposal is the best
approach for courts and the NLRB to follow. Part I provides an overview of
the manner in which courts and the NLRB treated the intersection of labor law
and bankruptcy law prior to Congress passing § 1113, and discusses the criteria
1

See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012).
Id. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(2).
3 Id. § 1113(c).
4 See id. § 1113.
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers,
Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1992) (granting § 1113 approval permitting rejection of collective bargaining
agreement, but limits debtor to imposing labor terms from its last, best offer).
6 Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to W. Bruce Gillis, Jr., Reg’l
Director of Region 27, Mile-Hi Metal Sys., Inc., No. 27-CA-9241 et al., 1997 WL 731480, at *12–13 (July 30,
1986) [hereinafter Mile-Hi Metal Memo] (NLRB prevents debtor from imposing 40% wage cuts on employees
because debtor may only impose terms “encompassed by [any] proposals that the employer presented to the
union” during pre-§ 1113 negotiations).
2

KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

3/5/2014 9:08 AM

CONSIDERING LABOR TERMS

209

for rejecting a collective bargaining agreement found in § 1113. Part II
highlights the lack of precedent in both court decisions and NLRB rulings
regarding which labor terms debtors should be permitted to impose following
rejection. It also draws a comparison to the analogous situation outside
bankruptcy of “bargain to impasse,” and suggests that bankruptcy courts
should adopt a similar standard that permits employers to impose any terms
“reasonably comprehended” in any pre-§ 1113 proposal.
Part III discusses the perverse incentives debtors would have during
negotiations if limited to imposing only terms from their “last, best offer” to
unions. If courts gave debtors broad latitude in the terms they could impose,
however, the incentive structure during negotiations would encourage desirable
behaviors while discouraging undesirable ones. Finally, Part IV examines the
two most common models of negotiation—the economic and problem-solving
models—and shows that an agreement is more likely under each model if
courts permit debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal if
negotiations fail.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy Prior to § 1113
1. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)
Before Congress adopted § 1113 in 1984, courts looked to § 365(a) of the
Code when considering whether to permit debtors to reject collective
bargaining agreements.7 Section 365(a) gives courts broad authority to permit
debtors to unilaterally decide whether to “assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease . . . .”8 The Code does not define what the term
“executory contract” actually means, but courts typically interpret the term
broadly.9 This gives debtors wide latitude to reject contracts under the

7 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521, 523 (1984); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 365.02[1], 365.03[5] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.02[1], 365.03[5].
9 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[2](a). The legislative history of § 365 indicates approval for the
definition espoused by Professor Vernon Countryman, who defined executory contracts as those “under which
the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other.” Vernon
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also S. REP.

KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

210

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

3/5/2014 9:08 AM

[Vol. 30

“business judgment test” if they apply their best business judgment and
determine it is in the best interests of the estate.10 Prior to Congress adopting
§ 1113, courts considered collective bargaining agreements to be executory
contracts that could be rejected by debtors under this simple and deferential
“business judgment” standard.11
2. Mixed Early Precedent on the Labor Law Implications of Rejecting
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy
While courts held broad authority under § 365(a) to approve the rejection
of collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts, many were unsure
of the best way to handle the intersection of labor law and bankruptcy law. In
particular, courts handed down mixed rulings about whether trustees and
debtors were subject to unfair labor practice charges under the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) if they rejected collective bargaining agreements
while in bankruptcy.12
In Durand v. NLRB,13 the trustee for the debtor rejected a collective
bargaining agreement with Local Union Number 2746, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.14 The union responded by filing
an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB alleging unlawful unilateral

NO. 95-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303.
10 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[2]; see also Grp. of Inst. Investors v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943) (citation omitted) (“[T]he question whether a lease should be rejected and,
if not, on what terms it should be assumed is one of business judgment.”); Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime
Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] bankruptcy court
reviewing a trustee’s or debtor-in-possession’s decision to assume or reject an executory contract should
examine [the] contract and the surrounding circumstances and apply its best ‘business judgment’ to determine
if it would be beneficial or burdensome to the estate to assume it.”); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re
Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979); Allied Tech., Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In re Allied
Tech., Inc.), 25 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (“As long as assumption of a lease appears to enhance
a debtor’s estate, [c]ourt approval of a debtor in possession’s decision to assume the lease should only be
withheld if the debtor’s judgment is clearly erroneous, too speculative, or contrary to the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, and particularly of 11 U.S.C. § 365.”).
11 Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522 (citation omitted) (“Any inference that collective-bargaining
agreements are not included within the general scope of § 365(a) because they differ for some purposes from
ordinary contracts . . . is rebutted by the statutory design of § 365(a) and by the language of § 1167 of the
Bankruptcy Code.”).
12 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[5](a); see also infra Part III.A.
13 Durand v. NLRB (In re Turney Wood Prods., Inc.), 296 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
14 Id. at 1051.
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modifications of the collective bargaining agreement.15 The trustee countered
by arguing that the NLRB had no jurisdiction in the case because the employer
was in bankruptcy.16 The NLRB, however, found that it did have jurisdiction,
and that the trustee had in fact engaged in unfair labor practices.17 The trustee
appealed the ruling to the district court, but the court sided with the NLRB,
reasoning “Congress has not seen fit to insulate a receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board as far
as unfair labor practices are concerned.”18
In contrast, the bankruptcy court in Shopmen’s Local Union Number 455 v.
Kevin Steel Products, Inc.19 allowed the debtor to reject its collective
bargaining agreement with Shopmen’s Local Union Number 455 International
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO.20
This led the union to appeal to the district court, and the NLRB filed unfair
labor practice charges against the debtor.21 After the district court found in
favor of the union, the debtor appealed to the Second Circuit.22
Contrary to both the district court and Durand, the Second Circuit ruled in
favor of the debtor, holding that it could reject the collective bargaining
agreement without committing an unfair labor practice because “a debtor in
possession . . . is not the same entity as the [prebankruptcy] company. A new
entity is created with its own rights and duties . . .” and is not subject to the old
collective bargaining agreement.23 Thus, no unfair labor practices accrue
against the new, postpetition entity for voiding the collective bargaining
agreement of the old, prepetition entity.24

15

Id.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1051, 1055.
19 Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
20 Id. at 700.
21 Id.
22 Id. The district court held that it did not have authority to authorize the rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement in light of the NLRA, despite the broad authority provided under § 365(a). Id.
23 Id. at 704.
24 Id.
16
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3. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco25
The uncertainty about how to treat overlapping labor and bankruptcy issues
in lower courts ultimately led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco. The Court confronted two key issues. First, the Court
sought to dictate the conditions under which a bankruptcy court could permit a
debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement.26 Second, the Court wished
to determine whether the NLRB could find a debtor guilty of committing an
unfair labor practice for unilaterally terminating or modifying a collective
bargaining agreement.27
a. Heightened Standard for Approving Rejection
To shed light on the first issue, the Court began by re-establishing the
premise that collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts under
§ 365(a) of the Code.28 The NLRB did not dispute this premise, but, citing
numerous circuit court precedents, argued instead that bankruptcy judges
should be required to apply a stricter standard than the classic “business
judgment” test when considering whether to permit rejection of collective
bargaining agreements.29 The Court agreed with the NLRB, noting that due to
the “special nature of a collective bargaining agreement . . . a somewhat
stricter standard” should be applied to the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement than to the rejection of other executory contracts.30
To apply this higher standard, the Court chose to adopt the new test
endorsed by the Third Circuit in Bildisco, prior to the Supreme Court granting
certiorari.31 The test allowed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
under § 365(a) “if the debtor can show that the [collective bargaining]
25

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
Id. at 516.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 522.
29 Id. at 523 (citation omitted).
30 Id. at 524. The Court specifically rejected a simultaneous argument by the union that the debtor and
the union should be required to bargain to impasse before a court can approve rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 526–27.
31 Id. at 525–26 (citation omitted). When the Third Circuit heard Bildisco, it held that the debtor was
permitted to reject the collective bargaining agreement, and that the NLRA did not apply because the “debtor
was a ‘new entity’ not bound by the labor agreement.” Id. at 519–20 (citation omitted). It also raised the
standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements beyond the typical “business judgment” test, instead
requiring the “debtor to show not only that the [collective bargaining] agreement is burdensome to the estate,
but also that the equities balance in favor of rejection.” Id. at 520–21 (citation omitted).
26
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agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities
balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract.”32 To appropriately balance the
equities, a court would balance “the interests of the affected parties—the
debtor, creditors, and employees.”33 Specifically, a court “must consider the
likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the
reduced value of the creditors’ claims that would follow from affirmance and
the hardship that would impose on them, and the impact of rejection on the
employees.”34 The Court added the requirement that the debtor be able to
demonstrate “reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have
been made and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.”35
b. No Unfair Labor Practice Violations
In addressing the second issue, the Court examined the question of whether
a debtor can be subject to unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA for
unilaterally rejecting a collective bargaining agreement between the date a
bankruptcy petition was filed and the date the bankruptcy court authorized
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.36 The union and the NLRB
both argued that debtors who reject collective bargaining agreements before
receiving court approval should be subject to unfair labor practice charges
under the NLRA.37 The Court, however, rejected this claim, stating that
accepting it “would largely, if not completely, undermine whatever benefit the
debtor-in-possession otherwise obtains by its authority to request rejection of
the agreement.”38 The Court went on to state that if courts permitted the NLRB
to pursue unfair labor practice charges under these circumstances, it would
practically force debtors to adhere to collective bargaining agreements that no
longer exist, and “would run directly counter to the express provisions of the

32

Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 526.
36 Id. at 527–29.
37 Id. at 528–29 (citation omitted).
38 Id. at 529. The Court also gave a technical justification for its decision. Reasoning that § 365(g) of the
Code regards rejection of executory contracts as a prepetition action, claims relating to rejection must be
considered only through the normal bankruptcy claims administration process. So, charges against the debtor
under the NLRA are precluded, and recovery can only occur through the claims administration process. Id. at
530.
33
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[Code] and to the Code’s overall effort to give a debtor-in-possession some
flexibility and breathing space.”39
B. 11 U.S.C. § 1113
1. Fallout from Bildisco
Labor unions, believing that the Bildisco decision made it too easy for
employers to reject collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy, lobbied
Congress to pass legislation that would overrule the decision.40 The Court
announced its decision in Bildisco on February 22, 1984, and just over six
weeks later, on April 10, 1984, the Senate Committees on Labor and Human
Resources and on the Judiciary held a joint hearing to discuss how to better
harmonize the interplay between the NLRA and the Code.41 According to the
Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Utah Senator
Orrin Hatch, the goals of the hearing were to:
determine what, if any, adjustments are needed to integrate
successfully the goals of the National Labor Relations Act and the
Bankruptcy Code. Together, these statutory schemes should function
to ensure that a unionized debtor can undergo financial rehabilitation
in a timely and equitable manner, without really subverting the
collective-bargaining process or undermining the ability of a union to
fulfill its representative responsibility on behalf of its particular
42
employees.

Unions took full advantage of this hearing, making their disdain for the
Bildisco decision impossible to miss. Leaders from a variety of unions and
labor advocacy organizations, including the AFL-CIO, the Food &
Commercial Workers Association, and the International Brotherhood of
39

Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
See 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[5](c). The House of Representatives responded to Bildisco by
introducing a bill one month after the Court announced its decision that would preclude unilateral rejection of
all collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. The bill also required the debtor to prove that it attempted
to “develop a complete reorganization plan at the bargaining table before ever coming to court[,]” and that
“rejection is the only way to reorganize the business and save union jobs.” The bill did not pass the Senate,
however, and Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, noted that
if the House bill were taken up, it would “sweep endangered business right past rehabilitation into liquidation.”
Oversight on Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Bildisco Decision: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Labor & Human Res., and S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 2 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing].
41 Hearing, supra note 40, at 2.
42 Id. at 1.
40
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Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America submitted
statements to the Committees opposing the Bildisco decision.43 Laurence Gold,
counsel for the AFL-CIO, urged the Committees to adopt new legislation to
overrule Bildisco.44 He believed that the ruling incorrectly prioritized
bankruptcy policy over labor policy, and erroneously interpreted Congressional
intent based on a “very slender foundation.”45 He also criticized the ruling for
“giv[ing] debtors a practical assurance that collective bargaining agreements
may be repudiated with impunity, at least as long as there is some minimal
attempt to negotiate with the union.”46
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters echoed the AFL-CIO’s
sentiments.47 Expressing concern that “many [employers] have attempted to
lower costs by pursuing exploitive labor policies,” the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters bemoaned that “[h]eavy-handed threats to file for
bankruptcy in order to coerce sacrifices from employees have become a stock
weapon in management’s arsenal against labor,” and “a threat to the entire
system of collective bargaining that is so basic to our Nation’s labor policies
and . . . to the basic structure of the American economy.”48 But the worst part
of the Bildisco decision, according to the union, was “the fact that the decision
effectively destroys the incentive for the parties to reach a mutually
satisfactory solution at the bargaining table.”49
2. Congress Enacts § 1113
Responding to passionate lobbying from organized labor, Congress enacted
§ 1113 of the Code on July 10, 1984 as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments
43
44
45
46

Id. at iii.
Id. at 62–63.
Id.
Id. at 63. Gold further decried the impact of Bildisco by stating:
The Bildisco standard is so open-textured as to provide no limitations on the court at all. The
factors that standard requires to be consulted are extremely complex and inherently
incommensurate, and the entire thrust of the reorganization proceeding in such situations is to
give great weight to the debtor’s expressed desires and to resolve all doubts in his favor. We see
no need to speculate at any length on the possibilities. It is sufficient that those who know their
interest best, management and unions, divide as follows: The employer community praises the
decision, and we condemn it. The winners and losers are plain enough.

Id. (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 17.
48 Id. at 18.
49 Id.
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and Federal Judgeship Act.50 Section 1113 functionally overruled the Bildisco
holding, and laid out three specific requirements that debtors must meet before
courts will approve rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.51 The three
requirements are: (1) a debtor must make a proposal for modifications to the
existing collective bargaining agreement necessary to its reorganization based
on the most reliable information available at the time; (2) the union must reject
the proposal without good cause; and (3) the balance of the equities must
clearly favor rejection of the agreement.52
In practice, courts typically apply § 1113 by means of the analysis found in
In re American Provision Co.,53 where the court laid out nine requirements
extrapolated from the full Code section, including, but not limited to, the three
requirements listed above.54 In American Provision, the debtor sought court
approval to reject two collective bargaining agreements with the Miscellaneous
Drivers, Helpers and Warehousemen’s Union.55 In reviewing the debtor’s
motion, the court interpreted § 1113 to require that the following nine
requirements be satisfied before approving rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement:56
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the [union] to
57
modify the collective bargaining agreement.
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable
58
information available at the time of the proposal.

50 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 390
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012)); see also Orange Cnty. Emps. Ass’n v. Cnty. of Orange (In
re Cnty. of Orange), 179 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (footnote omitted) (“Labor unions were very
upset at the Supreme Court’s decision in Bildisco that collective-bargaining agreements were not enforceable
in bankruptcy prior to rejection. In response, Congress passed § 1113.”); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
2467 n.147 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006) (citation omitted) (“Section 1113 has been
characterized as resulting from a major lobbying effort by labor that was directed at reducing the authority of
the bankruptcy court and increasing the role of negotiations between parties.”).
51 11 U.S.C. § 1113; see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468.
52 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c).
53 In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
54 Id. at 909; see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468.
55 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 908.
56 Courts have universally applied these nine criteria when considering similar motions in cases
following American Provision. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468.
57 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l
Ass’n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc. (In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.), 899 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted) (“At the heart of this matter is the requirement in [§] 1113(b)(1)(A) that the debtor make a proposal
[to the union]. . . .”); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468.
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3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the
59
reorganization of the debtor.
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the
60
debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
5. The debtor must provide to the [union] such relevant information
61
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.

58

Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A); In re Liberty Cab &
Limousine Co., 194 B.R. 770, 776–77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (refusing to approve rejection because most
complete and reliable information available did not underpin debtor’s proposal, and debtor did not provide this
information to union before hearing); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468.
59 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. Most courts define “necessary” as merely making reorganization more feasible.
See, e.g., Mile Hi Metal, 899 F.2d at 892–93 (rejecting the view that the necessity requirement means
“absolutely necessary” and instead holding that it requires the modifications to “be directly related to the
debtor’s financial condition” in completing a successful reorganization); Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey
Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he necessity requirement places on the debtor the burden of
proving that its proposal is made in good faith, and that it contains necessary, but not absolutely minimal,
changes that will enable the debtor to complete the reorganization process successfully.”). The Third Circuit,
however, has taken a contrarian approach, and held that a stricter standard than mere necessity should apply.
See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“‘[N]ecessity’ [should] be construed strictly to signify only modifications that the trustee is constrained to
accept because they are directly related to the Company’s financial condition and its reorganization. We reject
the hypertechnical argument that ‘necessary’ and ‘essential’ have different meanings because they are in
different subsections. The words are synonymous.”).
60 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. Courts consider a variety of factors when determining if all parties receive fair
treatment, and state “equity requires management to tighten its belt along with labor.” In re Carey Transp. Inc.,
50 B.R. 203, 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Truck Drivers Local 807, 816 F.2d at 90–91 (court looks
favorably on rejection when management and non-unionized employee groups take pay cuts, in addition to
those requested of unions); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1091 (rejection not permitted by the court
because no “snap-back” provision was included in the proposal that would raise wages and benefits for union
members if company recovered strongly); Int’l Union v. Gatke Corp., 151 B.R. 211, 214 (N.D. Ind. 1991)
(lack of “snap-back” provision permissible because of debtor’s exceptionally poor economic conditions, and
the fact that all employee groups were similarly affected); In re K&B Mounting, Inc., 50 B.R. 460, 464
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (court looks favorably on concessions made by suppliers, secured creditors, taxing
authorities, management, and non-union employees).
61 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(B); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. While similar to the second criterion that mandates the debtor provide
information on which the proposal is based, this requirement forces the debtor to provide information for the
union to evaluate the merits of the proposal itself. Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909 n.2 (emphasis added); see
also George Cindrich Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Indep. Haulers Bldg. Material & Constr. Drivers Local No. 341
(In re George Cindrich Gen. Contracting, Inc.), 130 B.R. 20, 23–24 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (debtor providing
union solely with fourteen-month old, incomplete bankruptcy petition and schedules, not sufficient to satisfy
requirement of providing union with relevant information to evaluate the proposal); In re Fiber Glass Indus.,
Inc., 49 B.R. 202, 206–07 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985) (debtor providing union with projected cost savings from
reorganization without also detailing that cost savings would be achieved by laying off one-third of union
workers represents failure to meet requirement of disclosing relevant information to evaluate proposal).
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6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the
hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at reasonable times with
62
the [union].
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting
to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective
63
bargaining agreement.
8. The [union] must have refused to accept the proposal without good
64
cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the
65
collective bargaining agreement.

62

Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(2); N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6
v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (ten hours for
union to evaluate and respond to debtor’s proposal before commencement of hearing to reject current
collective bargaining agreement is sufficient); In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1987) (debtor meeting two times with union is sufficient); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 55 B.R.
712, 716 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (citations omitted) (not “inherently unreasonable” that debtor filed to reject
collective bargaining agreement four days after presenting proposed modifications to union), rev’d on other
grounds, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Ky. Truck Sales, 52 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985)
(debtor meeting four times with union is sufficient to constitute meeting at “reasonable times”); Am. Provision
Co., 44 B.R. at 911 (criterion not satisfied when only one meeting occurred between debtor and union and
debtor did not pursue union’s offer to meet further); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469.
63 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(2); In re Horsehead Indus., 300 B.R.
573, 588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citations omitted) (permitting rejection of the collective bargaining
agreements of the first two locals, but not the third where debtor would not negotiate in good faith with
union,); In re GCI, Inc. 131 B.R. 685, 695 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (not permitting the rejection when debtor
does not bargain in good faith, even if union also did not bargain in good faith); Ky. Truck Sales, 52 B.R. at
801 (satisfying requirement when debtor genuinely attempts to negotiate reasonable changes to collective
bargaining agreement, but parties’ positions are simply too far apart for agreement to be reached); In re S.A.
Mech., Inc., 51 B.R. 130, 131–32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) (holding that “take it or leave it” proposal from
debtor to union does not constitute good faith); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469.
64 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (c)(2); N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6
v. Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.), 848 F.2d 345, 349 (2d Cir. 1988)
(union rejecting debtor’s proposal is in good faith if union made compromise proposals that would satisfy its
needs while preserving savings for the debtor, but union stonewalling and hoping that the court will reject the
§ 1113 motion because it doesn’t satisfy other requirements for rejection does not constitute good cause);
Bowen Enters., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union (In re Bowen Enters., Inc.), 196 B.R.
734, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that union did not establish good cause for rejecting collective
bargaining agreement when its counterproposals and cost analyses are unrealistic and a sham); In re Sierra
Steel Corp., 88 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (holding that union did not show good cause when it
declined debtor’s proposal for fear of adverse consequences on collective bargaining negotiations with other
employers); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 840–41 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (union rejecting debtor
proposal on principle because it is not in employees’ best interest does not constitute good cause); 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469.
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The debtor bears the burden of proving to the court that it has met all nine
requirements for rejecting the collective bargaining agreement, while the union
has a burden of production.66 Specifically, “the union must come forward with
evidence of a proposed modification’s illegality, and the union’s own good
cause for rejecting the debtor’s proposal on such grounds, before the burden of
showing legality falls on the debtor.”67
II. THE LACK OF ON-POINT BANKRUPTCY PRECEDENT FROM COURTS AND
THE NLRB SHOULD SHIFT FUTURE COURTS’ FOCUS TO SIMILAR LABOR LAW

PRECEDENT
The Code and court precedent are clear about the requirements that must be
satisfied before a court can approve the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement under § 1113, but are silent on which labor terms management may
actually impose once the court has approved the rejection.68 The Code requires
debtors to submit a proposal to the union containing only “necessary”
modifications to the existing collective bargaining agreement to gain court
approval for rejection under § 1113, but once rejection is approved, the debtor
is not limited to imposing only the exact terms contained in this pre-§ 1113
proposal.69 Looking beyond this gap in the Code, there is also little bankruptcy
case law that addresses what terms the debtor may impose after rejection.

65 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 50, at 2469. The Second Circuit listed six considerations that other courts look to when deciding
whether the balance of equities favors rejection. Those considerations are:

(1) the likelihood and consequences of liquidation if rejection is not permitted; (2) the likely
reduction in the value of creditors’ claims if the bargaining agreement remains in force; (3) the
likelihood and consequences of a strike if the bargaining agreement is voided; (4) the possibility
and likely effect of any employee claims for breach of contract if rejection is approved; (5) the
cost-spreading abilities of the various parties, taking into account the number of employees
covered by the bargaining agreement and how various employees’ wages and benefits compare to
those of others in the industry; and (6) the good or bad faith of the parties in dealing with the
debtor’s financial dilemma.
Truck Drivers Local 807, 816 F.2d at 93 (citations omitted).
66 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc. (In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.), 899
F.2d 887, 891–92 (10th Cir. 1990); see also In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 643 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1991).
67 Mile Hi Metal, 899 F.2d at 892.
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
69 See id.
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As a result of bankruptcy law’s silence, the logical place for courts to turn
for guidance is federal labor law. In particular, the scenario that occurs when
courts have permitted rejection and debtors then impose labor terms on their
unions is analogous to the “unilateral implementation of a proposal at impasse”
during labor negotiations outside of bankruptcy.70 Given the similarities
between the two scenarios71 and the lack of guidance from bankruptcy law,
courts should adhere to the standard applied in bargain to impasse cases and
permit debtors to impose any terms discussed during pre-§ 1113 negotiations
instead of limiting them to imposing terms from only their “last, best offer” to
the union.
A. Bankruptcy Court Precedent Is Sparse in Support of Limiting the Debtor to
Its “Last, Best Offer”
There are just two instances in which courts have addressed this issue and
held that a debtor is limited to imposing labor terms from only its “last, best
offer” to the union.72 Neither court cited any controlling authority in adopting
this approach.73

70

2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475; see also infra Part II.C.1.
See infra Part II.C.3.
72 N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998).
73 Some courts have also taken the position that bankruptcy courts do not have the authority to dictate the
specific terms that a post-§ 1113 debtor may impose on its union. Section 1113(b) requires employers to make
a proposal to the union that includes “necessary modifications” to employee benefits, but § 1113(c), which
covers criteria that must be satisfied for courts to reject collective bargaining agreements, makes no mention of
the court having authority to require modifications of specific terms of the agreement. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(b)–(c). As a result, some courts have interpreted § 1113 as precluding courts from dictating specific
terms debtors must impose on unions. See, e.g., In re Ala. Symphony Ass’n, 155 B.R. 556, 572 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1993) (“Although the proposal under [§ 1113(b)(1)(A)] must provide only for necessary modifications,
nothing on the face of the statute indicates that the modification language is folded in to subsection (c), which
on its face speaks only in terms of rejection . . . .”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 211 B.R. 65 (N.D. Ala. 1996);
In re Sun Glo Coal Co., 144 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992). But see Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d at
85, 91–92; In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 314–15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (authorizing debtor to
impose labor terms from an agreement approved by union leaders and rejected in a ratification vote but
refusing to allow debtor to impose terms from earlier proposals during § 1113 negotiations), aff’d sub nom.,
Nw. Airlines Corp. v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, 483 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007); Condere Corp., 228
B.R. at 619; In re Garafalo’s Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing § 105(a)
along with § 1113 as jointly giving court authority to dictate terms imposed on union).
71
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1. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re
Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.)74
In re Maxwell Newspapers is a prime example of an appellate court
limiting a debtor to imposing terms from only its “last, best offer” after the
court approves rejection of an existing collective bargaining agreement. In
Maxwell Newspapers, the holding company of the New York Daily News was
losing significant money operating the newspaper and consequently was
looking for a buyer to purchase its assets.75 The company filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy and found a buyer interested in purchasing the New York Daily
News who conditioned his interest on getting rid of the collective bargaining
agreement the newspaper had with its typesetters union.76 In particular, the
potential buyer objected to a provision in the agreement that guaranteed every
member of the union a job for life.77
The debtor, along with the potential buyer, made an initial proposal to the
union that would eliminate the lifetime employment provision.78 The union
countered with a proposal calling for a “progressive reduction in the number of
shifts worked conditioned upon a cash buyout for each union member, three
years’ contribution to the pension and welfare funds, and an early retirement
enhancement.”79 The parties subsequently exchanged three additional
proposals before the debtor and potential buyer made the union a final offer.80
The union rejected the final offer and the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to
reject the collective bargaining agreement, which the bankruptcy court
approved.81 The union appealed to the district court, which reversed the
bankruptcy court’s decision because it found that the union had “good cause”
to reject the final offer.82 The debtor appealed this decision to the Second
74

Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d 85.
Id. at 87.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 88.
80 Id. In this final offer, the debtor and potential buyer proposed an immediate reduction in jobs from the
current 167 to 80, eventually falling to 15, all of which would be guaranteed for thirteen years. In addition, the
debtor and potential buyer also agreed to a small early retirement subsidy, but refused to make any continuing
pension or welfare contributions, offering instead to make a one-time payment of $1 million to the pension
fund. Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 89.
75
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Circuit, which reversed the district court’s ruling, reasoning that the union did
not have good cause to reject the final offer because it was asking for more
money than the debtor or potential buyer could afford.83
The Second Circuit ruled that the debtor could reject the collective
bargaining agreement, but that it would be limited to imposing labor terms
found in its final offer to the union.84 The court further conditioned its
judgment on the requirement that the offers the debtor made at the end of
negotiations “are not now to be withdrawn.”85 The court neither cited any
authority for imposing this condition, nor provided any explanation of its
rationale.86
2. In re Condere Corp.87
Likewise, in In re Condere Corp., a tire manufacturer filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy and commenced negotiations with Local Union No. 303L of the
United Steelworkers of America Rubber Plastic Conference to modify a
collective bargaining agreement the parties had signed the previous year.88
After six weeks of futile negotiations, the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to reject
the collective bargaining agreement, which the court approved.89
The court’s approval, however, came on the condition that the debtor could
only impose terms from its “last, best offer” on several key points.90 Similar to
Maxwell Newspapers, the court did not cite any authority to justify this
limitation.91
B. NLRB Precedent is Sporadic and Mostly Inapplicable
With bankruptcy law’s silence on which terms the debtor may impose after
obtaining a court’s approval for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
under § 1113, the next intuitive place to search for a solution is NLRB
precedent. Like bankruptcy courts, however, the NLRB has rarely touched this
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 89, 91.
Id. at 91–92.
Id.
Id. at 92.
In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998).
Id. at 618–19.
Id. at 619.
Id.
See id.
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issue, and on the few times it has, it has served only to limit debtors to
imposing labor terms that had been proposed during pre-§ 1113 negotiations.92
As the following cases demonstrate, the NLRB has not offered any insight into
which particular terms debtors can impose from the proposals they do make.93
1. Appletree Markets, Inc.94
In Appletree Markets, Inc., the debtor filed for chapter 11 and after six
months of negotiations with its union failed to produce a new collective
bargaining agreement, the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to reject the existing
collective bargaining agreement, which the bankruptcy court approved.95
During pre-§ 1113 negotiations, the debtor had proposed decreasing health
insurance, pension, and welfare contributions, but never reached common
ground with its union.96 When the court approved its § 1113 motion, however,
the debtor dropped the existing healthcare plan altogether and substituted its

92 See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Michael Dunn, Reg’l
Dir. of Region 16, Appletree Mkts., Inc., No. 16-CA-15724, 1994 NLRB GCM LEXIS 68, at *9 (Nov. 30,
1994) [hereinafter Appletree Mkts. Memo] (stating that because the employer only proposed decreasing
contributions to health insurance plans during pre-§ 1113 negotiations, its subsequent action to drop the
union’s plan and substitute its own self-insurance plan was unlawful); Advice Memorandum from the NLRB
Office of the Gen. Counsel to Federick Calatrello, Regional Director of Region 8, Amherst Sparkle Mkt., No.
8-CA-20323 et al., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 167, at *14 (Feb. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Amherst Sparkle Mkt.
Memo] (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to suspend contributions to health, welfare, and pension
plans because it never made such a proposal to modify contributions during pre-§ 1113 negotiations); Mile-Hi
Metal Memo, supra note 6, at *2–3 (finding it illegal for an employer to impose 40% wage cuts after receiving
§ 1113 approval when no wage cuts beyond 30% were “encompassed” in any pre-§ 1113 proposals). The
NLRB has justified its position by holding that employers who attempt to unilaterally implement terms
different than those discussed in advance of filing § 1113 motions are guilty of violating the duty imposed on
them under the NLRA to bargain with the union, notify the union of proposed changes, and bargain them to
impasse before implementing terms unilaterally. See Appletree Mkts. Memo, supra, at *7; Mile-Hi Metal
Memo, supra note 6, at *12–13.
93 One notable exception to the NLRB’s general lack of guidance is found in Royal Composing Room,
Inc., when the NLRB barred the employer from imposing any labor terms other than those contained in its
“last, best offer” to the union. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Daniel
Silverman, Reg’l Dir. of Region 2, Royal Composing Room, Inc., No. 2-CA-21808, 1987 NLRB GCM LEXIS
139 (Sept. 30, 1987). But, the employer subsequently appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit, which
ultimately permitted the employer to impose a labor term on the union from its initial § 1113 proposal, thereby
functionally overruling the NLRB’s opinion limiting the employer to imposing terms only from its last, best
offer. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.),
848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988).
94 1994 NLRB GCM LEXIS 68 (Nov. 30, 1994).
95 Appletree Mkts. Memo, supra note 92, at *1–2.
96 Id. at *2–3.
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own self-insurance plan.97 The NLRB found that this action violated the
employer’s duty to bargain under the NLRA because during pre-§ 1113
negotiations the debtor had only proposed reducing healthcare contributions,
not eliminating the plan entirely.98
2. Amherst Sparkle Market99
In Amherst Sparkle Market, the owner of a retail grocery store had been a
party to a collective bargaining agreement with his unionized employees for
the previous three years.100 The employer sought to renegotiate the collective
bargaining agreement in search of more favorable terms, but when the union
refused its proposals, the employer filed for chapter 11.101
After filing, the debtor made a proposal to the union calling for pay cuts;
reduced vacation days and paid holidays; a ban on “premium pay;” eliminating
established work weeks for part-time employees; and reducing the present
health, pension, and welfare benefits, among other reductions.102 The union
rejected the offer.103 As a consequence, the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to
reject the collective bargaining agreement entirely.104 The parties subsequently
bargained for two additional months and were unable to reach an agreement,
prompting the court to approve the § 1113 motion.105
After gaining court approval for rejection, the debtor imposed labor terms
on the union that included suspending pension contributions for one year and
ceasing to make health and welfare contributions for ninety more days.106 The
union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB over the unexpected
changes to its “base terms,” and the NLRB agreed that the employer had
committed a violation.107 The NLRB ruled that because the changes to the
pension, health, and welfare contributions had not been contained in any of the

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at *4.
Id. at *8–9.
1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 167 (Feb. 25, 1988).
Amherst Sparkle Mkt. Memo, supra note 92, at *1–2.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8–9.
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employer’s pre-§ 1113 proposals, they constituted a violation of the NLRA and
were thus illegal.108
3. Mile-Hi Metal Systems, Inc.109
In Mile-Hi Metal Systems, the metal manufacturing employer filed for
chapter 11 and, after two subsequent strikes by the union, received permission
from the bankruptcy court to make interim adjustments to the parties’ existing
collective bargaining agreement while the negotiations on permanent
modifications continued.110 During the ongoing negotiations between the
parties, the employer made proposals on several labor terms, including
reducing wages by 30% for most union members.111 When continued
negotiations failed to produce an agreement, the court approved the employer’s
§ 1113 motion to reject the collective bargaining agreement entirely.112
The employer then imposed a 40% wage cut on nearly all union members
that was not “encompassed by the proposals that the employer presented to the
union” during pre-§ 1113 negotiations.113 The union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB against the employer in response to this
action.114 The NLRB ruled that the employer’s action was illegal because it
“actually reduced wages by approximately 40%, more than the 30% reduction
originally proposed by the [e]mployer and more than the 25% reduction which
constituted its final offer.”115 As a consequence, the NLRB ruled that the
employer had violated the NLRA.116

108

See id. at *9.
Mile-Hi Metal Memo, supra note 6, at *4.
110 Id. at *1; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (2012) (granting courts authority to approve interim changes to
collective bargaining agreements while parties negotiate permanent modifications).
111 Mile-Hi Metal Memo, supra note 6, at *1. Other proposed terms included reducing travel expense
reimbursements, requiring employees to supply their own tools, permitting employees to transport tools in
their own vehicles, permitting the employer to hire replacement workers if the union went on strike in the
future without requiring those workers to join the union, and modifying the provision regarding appointing
union stewards. Id. at *2.
112 Id.
113 Id. at *3.
114 Id. at *4.
115 Id. at *12–13.
116 Id. at *5.
109
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C. Substantial Precedent Exists in the Analogous Labor Law Situation of
Bargain to Impasse
Given the lack of guidance from the Code and the sporadic precedent from
bankruptcy case law and the NLRB, courts addressing the issue of which terms
debtors may impose after rejection should look for guidance in the consistent
precedent that addresses an analogous situation, “unilateral implementation of
a proposal at impasse,” under federal labor law.117 Taking a cue from such
impasse cases, bankruptcy courts should give debtors the latitude to impose
terms discussed throughout pre-§ 1113 negotiations, including those offered in
the initial § 1113 proposal, and should not limit the debtor to only imposing
terms from its “last, best offer.”
1. Bargain to Impasse
Federal labor law precedent establishes that an employer may declare a
legally recognizable “impasse” when “irreconcilable differences” between the
employer and the union, after “full good faith negotiations,” lead to a
“stalemate.”118 An employer that makes unilateral changes to labor terms
before the parties reach a genuine impasse violates its duty to bargain with the
union under the NLRA.119 Once the parties do reach an impasse, however,
courts and the NLRB universally permit the employer to unilaterally impose
any terms that were “reasonably comprehended” in any pre-impasse
proposals.120
A series of rulings from the NLRB have served to establish specific factors
indicating that parties have reached a true bargaining impasse.
a. Taft Broadcasting Co.121
In Taft Broadcasting Co., the employer acquired a television and a radio
station from a third party, and also assumed the collective bargaining
117

2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475.
1 id. at 988–89.
119 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745–46 (1962); see also infra Part III.A.
120 NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1961); see also infra Part II.C.2. In
Katz, the Supreme Court specifically barred employers from implementing changes to labor terms that were
not discussed during pre-impasse bargaining with the union. The Court described attempts to impose terms
outside the scope of negotiations as “a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of
[the National Labor Relations Act] much as does a flat refusal” to negotiate. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743.
121 Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967).
118
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agreement negotiated by its predecessor with the American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, Kansas City Local.122 One year later,
the parties held the first of a series of bargaining sessions to try and reach a
new collective bargaining agreement.123 The negotiations were contentious
because the employer wanted an agreement representing a “substantial
departure from the agreement then in effect,” while the union sought “a
carryover of the old contract with increases in wage rates and fringe
benefits . . . .”124
The parties met more than twenty-three times over a six-month period
without reaching an agreement.125 Despite having narrowed the gap between
the parties to only a handful of issues, the employer declared an impasse and
unilaterally imposed labor terms.126 The union responded by filing unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB, but the NLRB sided with the employer.127 In
its ruling, the NLRB defined “impasse” as the point at which “good-faith
negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement.”128 It
defined the characteristics that should be examined in figuring out whether or
not an impasse exists:
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The
bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the
length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to
which there is disagreement, [and] the contemporaneous
understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations are all
relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an impasse in
129
bargaining exist[s].

The NLRB applied these factors to the case at hand and determined that the
parties had in fact reached an impasse.130 It noted that the parties had
“bargained in good faith with a sincere desire to reach agreement” and had met
more than twenty-three times to negotiate, yet “progress was imperceptible on
the critical issues and each [party] believed that, as to some of those issues,

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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they were further apart than when they had begun negotiations.”131 Thus,
because the NLRB was “unable to conclude that a continuation of bargaining
sessions would have culminated in a bargaining agreement,” it determined that
a true impasse had in fact been reached and permitted the employer to
unilaterally impose labor terms on the union.132
b. Taft and Beyond
Since deciding Taft, the NLRB has continued to use a similar definition of
impasse, and applies the same set of factors to determine when an impasse
exists.133 Beyond the factors laid out in Taft, however, the NLRB has also
considered a variety of other factors in determining whether an impasse exists.
These factors include: (1) “[w]hether there has been a strike or the union has
consulted the employees about one;” (2) the “fluidity” of the parties’ positions;
(3) whether the parties continued to bargain even after one side declared an
impasse; (4) whether the parties both believe that impasse has been reached;
(5) the union’s hostility level towards the employer, (6) the “nature and
importance of issues and the extent of difference or opposition;” (7) the
“bargaining history;” (8) whether either party has “demonstrated willingness to
consider the issue further;” (9) the “duration of hiatus between bargaining
meetings;” (10) the “number and duration of bargaining sessions;” and (11)
any “other actions inconsistent with impasse.”134
2. “Reasonably Comprehended” Standard in Bargain to Impasse Cases
Federal courts consistently prevent employers from imposing terms on their
unions that were not included in any pre-impasse proposals. This principle
started with an early Supreme Court decision and continued with two
subsequent opinions—one from the Fifth Circuit and another from the
Supreme Court—that established the generally accepted modern standard: any

131

Id.
Id. In response to the union’s argument that no impasse existed because only a few issues remained to
be solved for an agreement to be reached, the court stated that “an impasse is no less an impasse because the
parties were closer to agreement than previously, and a deadlock is still a deadlock whether produced by one
or a number of significant and unresolved differences in positions.” Id.
133 See, e.g., A.M.F. Bowling Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 969, 978 (1994) (citations omitted) (defining impasse as
“the point in time of negotiations when the parties are warranted in assuming that further bargaining would be
futile. Both parties must believe that they are at the end of their rope.”).
134 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 990–94.
132

KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

3/5/2014 9:08 AM

CONSIDERING LABOR TERMS

229

post-impasse terms imposed on unions must be “reasonably comprehended”
within pre-impasse proposals.
a. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.135
In 1949, in NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., the Supreme Court
examined for the first time the issue of which terms an employer could impose
on its union after bargaining to impasse.136 The employer and the union
representing the production and maintenance employees at a cotton mill
sparred over the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement.137 The parties
negotiated for five months and agreed on many issues, but were unable to
reach an agreement on the most important issue: wage increases.138 The
employer made only one proposal to the union regarding wage increases,
offering an additional one to one-and-a-half cents per hour, which the union
rejected immediately.139
The negotiations ultimately reached impasse and, twelve days later, the
employer unilaterally imposed a two to six cents per hour wage increase for all
union members—a “substantially larger” increase than any it had offered
during pre-impasse negotiations.140 The employer had not consulted with the
union before implementing this wage increase and had not given the union an
opportunity to negotiate the new term.141
The NLRB ruled this action by the employer constituted an unfair labor
practice, and, after the district court and the Fifth Circuit refused to uphold the
NLRB’s findings, the case reached the Supreme Court.142 The Supreme Court
reversed the two lower court decisions, and upheld the NLRB’s ruling, thereby
precluding employers from implementing terms “which are substantially
different from, or greater than, those which the employer has proposed during
its [pre-impasse] negotiations” with the union.143 This holding marked the first
135

NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
See generally id.
137 Id. at 219.
138 Id. at 218.
139 Id. at 221.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 220.
143 Id. at 225. The Court wrote that the core problem was that the new wage term was nowhere to be
found in any of the employer’s pre-impasse proposals. Id. at 224–25. Had the proposed wage term been
included in any pre-impasse proposals, there would have been no problem with the employer imposing the
136
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time the Court had limited the terms an employer may impose on its union to
those contained within pre-impasse proposals, and was a clear victory for the
NLRB.
b. NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc.144
In 1961, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc. built on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Crompton-Highland Mills and created a
standard now applied universally by courts and the NLRB in determining
which labor terms an employer may impose on its union after bargaining to
impasse. In Intercoastal Terminal, the employer owned two businesses that
were jointly treated as a single employer under the NLRA.145 The first
business, named Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., was a plant that received, stored,
and shipped oil field materials owned by its customers, while the second
business, named Louisiana Processing Company, Inc., was a plant that ground
and processed barium sulphate.146 Two months before the workers in each
plant jointly unionized, the employer announced that it was modifying its
vacation policy, effective the following year, to give both black and white
employees equal vacation time.147
After the employees unionized, the parties held nine bargaining sessions
where they exchanged numerous proposals without reaching an agreement,
ultimately reaching an impasse.148 Shortly thereafter the employer’s business
slowed down, causing it to unilaterally reduce the work schedules of most
union members and to quietly rescind the vacation policy it had announced
before the union formed.149 In response, the union filed a complaint with the
NLRB alleging a variety of unfair labor practices.150 Chief among them was
that the employer had violated the NLRA by unilaterally altering the
employees’ work schedules and changing the vacation policy for a group of
term because it would “carry no disparagement of the collective bargaining proceedings” and may “be
welcomed by the bargaining representative, without prejudice to the rest of the negotiations.” Id. (citations
omitted).
144 NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961).
145 Id. at 955.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. After the ninth session, the employer offered to memorialize with the union the issues that the
parties had agreed upon, but the union never responded to the offer. Id.
149 Id. at 956–57. A few months later, the Louisiana Processing Company went out of business, and the
employer laid off six union members. Id. at 957.
150 Id. at 955–57.
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union employees.151 The NLRB ruled in favor of the union on both charges
and the employer appealed.152
The appeal reached the Fifth Circuit, which held the employer had not
erred by altering the employees’ work schedules when the parties reached an
impasse, but had erred when it altered the vacation policy.153 The reason the
court found differently on the two allegations was simple: the employer’s
ability to unilaterally alter work schedules was “reasonably comprehended
within its earlier proposals” before the parties had reached an impasse, but the
change to the vacation policy “was not within the area of negotiations during
the bargaining sessions and was therefore not a permissible activity even
following the impasse.”154
c. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.155
The standard set in Intercoastal Terminal that employers may impose terms
“reasonably comprehended” in pre-impasse proposals has since been applied
universally by circuit courts and the NLRB in similar cases.156 The Supreme
Court affirmed the validity of the standard in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. In
Brown, the collective bargaining agreement between the National Football
League (“NFL”) and the National Football League Players Association
(“NFLPA”) expired, causing the parties to begin negotiations toward a new
agreement.157
During the negotiations, the NFL proposed a plan permitting each team to
create a “developmental squad” of up to six players who would practice with
151

Id. at 957.
Id. at 957–58.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 958–59 (emphasis added).
155 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
156 See, e.g., Grondorf, Field, Black & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“When impasse
occurs, an employer may implement only those changes reasonably falling within its pre-impasse proposal.”);
Torrington Extend-A-Care Emp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580, 596 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that employer may
not delay by one month paying its employees for unused vacation days because such a term was not
“reasonably comprehended” in pre-impasse proposals); Cuyamaca Meats v. Butchers & Food Emp’rs Pension
Trust Fund, 827 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]fter impasse is reached an employer may unilaterally
implement new terms of employment only if reasonably comprehended in a pre-impasse offer.”); Allen W.
Bird II, 227 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1358 (1977) (“[I]t is well established that an employer can only make unilateral
changes in working conditions consistent with its rejected [offers] to a union.”); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 50, at 907–08.
157 Brown, 518 U.S. at 234.
152
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the rest of the team, play in games as substitutes for injured players, and earn a
non-negotiable salary of $1,000 per week.158 The NFLPA rejected this
proposal and made a counterproposal that would give each developmental
squad member benefits similar to those of regular players and the freedom to
negotiate their own salaries.159 The NFL rejected this counterproposal and
negotiations on the issue eventually reached an impasse, causing the NFL to
unilaterally impose terms from its pre-impasse proposal.160
In response, 235 developmental squad players brought an antitrust suit
against the NFL and its teams.161 The suit reached the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the Intercoastal Terminal standard adopted by lower courts and the
NLRB regarding which terms an employer could impose on its union after
reaching an impasse.162 The Court held that “[l]abor law regulates directly, and
considerably . . . the [post-impasse] imposition of a proposed employment
term,” further stating that “new terms must be ‘reasonably comprehended’
within the employer’s [pre-impasse] proposals” because “by imposing more or
less favorable terms, the employer unfairly undermine[s] the union’s status.”163
3. Close Similarities Between the Bargain to Impasse and Post-§ 1113
Scenarios Should Encourage Courts to Apply a Similar Standard for
Employers Imposing Labor Terms Post-§ 1113
There are many similarities between a debtor that has received court
approval under § 1113 to reject a collective bargaining agreement in
bankruptcy and an employer in the bargain to impasse situation outside of
bankruptcy.164 Each scenario ends with the employer unilaterally imposing
terms on its union after the parties have tried and failed to reach a new
collective bargaining agreement. Before reaching this end result in each
scenario, the law requires an employer to “meet at reasonable times”165 and
158

Id.
Id.
160 Id. at 234–35.
161 Id. at 235.
162 Id. at 238 (emphasis added). In addition to its labor law holding, the Court also found that an antitrust
exemption protected the NFL from antitrust liability for its concerted action. Id. at 237.
163 Id. at 238 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). While the Court stated that the new terms must be
“reasonably comprehended” within the employer’s pre-impasse proposals, it also stated the terms would
typically be drawn from the last rejected proposals. Id.
164 See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475.
165 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (requiring employer to “meet at reasonable times” during
collective bargaining), and 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 849–50, 891–96, with 11 U.S.C.
159
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“confer in good faith”166 with its union. Likewise, the employer in each
scenario is precluded from imposing labor terms on its union that it had never
proposed in pre-impasse or pre-§ 1113 negotiations.167 Furthermore, in each
scenario, the union retains the right to strike after the employer has imposed
terms unilaterally, which serves to deter employers from imposing overly
onerous terms.168
The only substantive difference between these two scenarios is that the
post-§ 1113 scenario occurs during bankruptcy proceedings while the bargain
to impasse scenario does not. Because the core elements of each scenario track
one another so closely, however, the post-§ 1113 scenario functionally occurs
when the parties have bargained to impasse during bankruptcy.169 With the
close similarities between the two scenarios, and the lack of guidance on the
post-§ 1113 scenario from the Code, bankruptcy case law, and the NLRB,
future courts should turn to the consistent precedent found in federal labor law
for the analogous bargain to impasse scenario when determining which terms
post-§ 1113 debtors may impose on their unions.
§ 1113(b)(2) (debtor must “meet at reasonable times” with union during § 1113 negotiations), and 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469.
166 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (requiring employer to “confer in good faith” during collective
bargaining), and 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 827, 855–919, with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(b)(2) (debtor must “confer in good faith” with union during § 1113 negotiations), and 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469.
167 The NLRB has consistently held that the debtor may not impose labor terms that did not appear in any
of its pre-§ 1113 proposals. See supra Part II.B. Likewise, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz specifically
barred employers from imposing labor terms that were not discussed during pre-impasse bargaining with the
union. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). The Court described attempts to impose terms outside the
scope of negotiations as “a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of [the
NLRA] much as does a flat refusal” to negotiate. Id.
168 There is clear case law confirming that employees retain the right to strike after the debtor has
unilaterally imposed labor terms following § 1113 rejection. See, e.g., In re Evans Prods. Co., 55 B.R. 231,
234 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Ky. Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (holding
that following rejection, “employees retain the right to strike as their ultimate bargaining tool”); see also 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475 (“[R]ejection of a collective bargaining agreement frees the
union to strike the employer.”). Likewise, there is also case law confirming that employees retain the right to
strike following an employer unilaterally imposing terms after impasse. See, e.g., NLRB v. McClatchy
Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1153, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[The] statutory right to strike . . . [is] beyond the
scope of the impasse rule.”).
169 While the bankruptcy context is a different backdrop for impasse than the non-bankruptcy context, the
key bankruptcy policy goal for debtors is to emerge from bankruptcy with a “fresh start.” Permitting debtors
broad authority to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal aligns with this policy goal by giving them a
greater opportunity to gain that fresh start than would restricting their ability to impose only terms from the
“last, best offer,” which may hinder them moving forward. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBOOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 115 (6th ed. 2008).
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Courts and the NLRB have universally permitted post-impasse employers
to unilaterally impose any terms on their unions that are “reasonably
comprehended” in any pre-impasse proposals.170 The approach most similar to
this “reasonably comprehended” standard is one that permits the debtor in
possession to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposals on the union after
gaining court approval to reject the existing collective bargaining agreement.
Applying a standard similar to the “reasonably comprehended” approach to
post-§ 1113 debtors would permit courts to consistently apply the law in two
analogous scenarios. This is the correct approach for courts to follow for
reasons of both consistency and clarity in an area of law that otherwise lacks
direction.
III. LIMITING POST-§ 1113 DEBTORS TO IMPOSING TERMS FROM THEIR “LAST,
BEST OFFER” DISCOURAGES DESIRABLE BEHAVIOR AND ENCOURAGES
UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR
If debtors are limited to imposing only terms from their “last, best offer” to
unions after rejection, they will be disincentivized from adhering to
fundamental mandates in both the NLRA and § 1113 to bargain in “good faith”
and meet with the union at “reasonable times.”171 Furthermore, without
flexibility in the terms they may impose should negotiations fail, debtors will
be incentivized to engage in unlawful surface bargaining172 with their unions
because the risks of trying to make a deal and failing will be greater than those
of being caught not genuinely trying to make a deal at all. Instead, if courts
permit debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal, the incentives
for debtors will flip, thereby encouraging desirable behaviors under the NLRA
and the Code while discouraging undesirable surface bargaining.
A. National Labor Relations Act173
The National Labor Relations Act has been the foundation of federal labor
law since Congress passed it in 1935. The NLRA created numerous rights and
protections for employees such as “the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through a representative of
170
171

See supra Part II.B.2.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50,

at 43.
172
173

See infra Part III.D.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
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their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”174 The NLRA also
provides specific guidance on how unions should be organized internally, sets
out unfair labor practices, and creates the National Labor Relations Board to
adjudicate unfair labor practice claims.175 Unfair labor practices for employers
found in the NLRA include, among others, “interfere[ing] with, restrain[ing],
or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” them to
organize and bargain collectively; mistreating employees because they are in a
union; or “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives
of . . . employees.”176
Chief among the policy goals of the NLRA is “encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining . . . for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions” of union employment.177 Furthering this policy focus on
promoting collective bargaining, § 158(d) of the NLRA clarifies the
requirements for parties involved in collective bargaining by stating, “[T]o
174 Id. § 157. Congress amended the NLRA twelve years after passing it by enacting the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”). Id. §§ 401–531. The LMRA altered the NLRA by refocusing
federal labor law on increasing rights and protections for employers instead of for employees. See id. §§ 141–
144, 167, 172–187. The LMRA gave employees the right to refrain from joining a union, made structural
changes to the NLRB, further codified what constitutes an unfair labor practice, specifically guaranteed that
both unions and employers could freely speak their minds without risk of committing an unfair labor practice,
set out fundamental duties for each party during collective bargaining, altered the employee grievance process
laid out in the NLRA, increased regulation of internal union affairs, made procedural changes to filing unfair
labor practice charges, laid out criteria for when the NLRB should issue injunctions, and prioritized state “right
to work” laws over union requirements. Id. §§ 141–144, 167, 172–187; see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 50, at 41–47.
175 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. The NLRB must toe a delicate balance between ensuring that parties
engage in whole-hearted collective bargaining discussions while at the same time not having the authority to
force parties to come to an agreement or to make particular concessions. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Am.
Nat’l Ins. confirmed the limits of the NLRB’s power when it stated that “the [NLRA] does not compel any
agreement whatsoever between employees and employers” and “it is equally clear that [under the NLRA] the
[NLRB] may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.” NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 399, 404
(1952). The Court did note, however, that “[e]nforcement of the obligation to bargain collectively is crucial to
the statutory scheme,” and as such, the NLRB does the best it can to enforce the obligation in spite of its
limitations. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. at 402.
176 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Other unfair labor practices by the employer under the NLRA include “to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it,” to discriminate “in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,” and “to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
subchapter.” Id.
177 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith . . . but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . .”178
Under the NLRA and § 1113 of the Code, bargaining in good faith and
meeting with the union at reasonable times are two core requirements of
collective bargaining negotiations.179 Adherence to each of these requirements
has been frequently litigated since Congress passed the NLRA, further
underscoring their importance to the collective bargaining process, as well as
the importance of aligning a debtor’s incentives to comply with each
requirement through the terms that courts will permit debtors to impose
following rejection.180
B. The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Many courts, beginning in 1940 with the Fourth Circuit in Highland
Park,181 have confirmed the existence of the duty to bargain in good faith.
Beyond merely confirming its existence, courts have consistently enforced it as
well in a series of rulings that define what it means to bargain in good faith.
1. NLRB v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co.182
In Highland Park, the employer held a few meetings with its union during
collective bargaining negotiations and received multiple proposals from the
union without making any substantive counterproposals.183 The employer
thought it had satisfied its bargaining obligation by merely meeting with the
union while, at the same time, repeatedly vowing not to sign any written
agreement with the union regardless of the proposed terms.184
The Fourth Circuit disapproved of both the employer’s words and actions,
and upheld the NLRB’s initial ruling that the employer had failed to bargain in
good faith.185 The court reasoned that the “attitude and position that
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. § 158(d) (emphasis added); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
See infra Parts III.B–C.
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.

KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

3/5/2014 9:08 AM

CONSIDERING LABOR TERMS

237

[management’s] representatives assumed . . . clearly show that the [employer]
was not then negotiating, nor did it intend to negotiate, in good faith with the
representatives of its employees . . . .”186 The court continued that while the
NLRA does not require that the parties agree, it does:
require that they negotiate in good faith with the view of reaching an
agreement if possible; and mere discussion with the representatives
of employees, with a fixed resolve on the part of the employer not to
enter into any agreement . . . even as to matters as to which there is
187
no disagreement, does not satisfy its provisions.

2. NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co.188
Other courts have followed the reasoning of Highland Park, issuing rulings
with similar definitions of good faith in order to rein in employers who fail to
display it. The Third Circuit addressed the issue in NLRB v. George P. Pilling
& Son Co. In Pilling, leaders of a newly formed union approached their
employer to begin collective bargaining negotiations to which the employer
saber-rattled that he “was not going to have any union run his business for
him,” while threatening to close the business or lay off anyone who joined the
union.189 Later, during negotiations, the employer rejected all of the union’s
proposals, refused to offer any counterproposals, and attempted to circumvent
union leadership by communicating directly with rank and file employees.190
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Highland Park, the Third Circuit
found that the employer’s actions failed to satisfy the requirement to bargain in
good faith.191 The court stated that “[b]argaining presupposes negotiations
between parties carried on in good faith. The fair dealing which the service of
good faith calls for must be exhibited by the parties in their approach and
attitude to the negotiations . . . .”192 In this case, where the employer would not
make a counterproposal, the court found that such inaction went “to support a
want of good faith, and hence, a refusal to bargain.”193

186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id.
Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 37.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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3. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.194
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.195 In Montgomery Ward, the employer, retail merchandiser
Montgomery Ward, was engaged in collective bargaining discussions with
unions for its retail clerks and warehousemen.196 During the negotiations, the
employer refused to make any proposals or to proactively further the
discussions.197 When both unions filed charges with the NLRB accusing the
employer of failing to bargain in good faith, the employer argued that the duty
to bargain collectively is simply “the duty to recognize the authority of the
employee representative, to participate in such discussion as is necessary to
avoid mutual misunderstanding, and to enter into binding agreements on such
terms [that are] mutually acceptable.”198 The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed, stating that good faith requires parties to “participate actively in the
deliberations . . . [and] to indicate a present intention to find a basis for
agreement, and a sincere effort must be made to reach a common
ground . . . .”199 The court concluded that “a mere formal presence at collective
bargaining with a completely closed mind and without this spirit of
[cooperation] and good faith” is insufficient.200
4. Additional Decisions Relating to the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Additional decisions have further expounded on what it means to bargain in
good faith, but all of them require, at their essence, that the parties negotiate
“with the purpose of trying to reach an agreement.”201 In practice, courts have
found employers to lack this requisite purpose when they have engaged in badfaith behaviors such as refusing union requests to negotiate,202 seeking to

194

NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
See generally id.
196 Id. at 679.
197 Id. at 683.
198 Id. at 686.
199 Id. (emphasis added).
200 Id.
201 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864; see generally, e.g., NLRB v. Sw. Porcelain
Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960);
Majure v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.
1941); Cal. Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209 (1960).
202 See, e.g., Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d at 885 (bad faith exists when employer “specifically
reject[s] proffered opportunities for negotiation”).
195
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undercut union authority,203 making “take it or leave it” offers,204 purposely
stalling negotiations,205 making lowball offers,206 and refusing to sign any
agreement.207 Likewise, in proceedings under § 1113(b)(2), courts require the
debtor in pre-§ 1113 negotiations to display a similar purpose to reach an
agreement with its union, and have found similar bad faith behaviors to violate
this good faith requirement.208
C. The Duty to Meet at Reasonable Times
The NLRA and § 1113 each also require the employer and its union to meet
at “reasonable times,” but neither defines what this means.209 Consequently,
courts and the NLRB rely heavily on fact-specific inquiries in individual cases
to determine whether the employer has met at reasonable times with its
union.210 Below are several such cases.

203 See, e.g., id. (finding that bad faith exists when employer tries “to undercut the authority of the [u]nion
as representative of its employees”); NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 36–38 (3d Cir. 1941)
(bad faith when employer posts notices in factories to circumvent union leadership).
204 See, e.g., Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d at 234 (employer’s take it or leave it offer reflects bad faith);
Majure, 198 F.2d at 737–38 (holding that employer’s refusal to make any concessions from its initial proposal
evinces bad faith “tantamount to a demand for complete unilateral control over all important terms and
conditions of employment [that negate] the collective bargaining principle envisaged by the [NLRA]”).
205 See, e.g., Sw. Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d at 530–31 (holding that employer evinces bad faith by
purposefully stalling negotiations by regularly requesting to review contract language that was previously
agreed upon, agreeing to many matters only in principle but not committing to firm terms, and failing to make
constructive suggestions on how to improve the contract language at issue).
206 See, e.g., Gadsden Tool, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 164, 170 (1998) (finding bad faith when employer made
only lowball offers, even though ultimately accepted by the union).
207 See, e.g., id. at 171 (stating that bad faith is displayed when employer verbally agrees to terms with
union but refuses to sign written contract).
208 See, e.g., In re Horsehead Indus., Inc., 300 B.R. 573, 590 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (permitting rejection
of the collective bargaining agreements of the first two locals, but prohibiting rejection of the third because
debtor neglected to negotiate in good faith with the third union local); In re GCI, Inc. 131 B.R. 685, 695
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (prohibiting rejection where debtor does not bargain in good faith, even if union also
did not bargain in good faith); In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (finding that
debtor did not negotiate in good faith where after only one meeting, union indicated desire to negotiate further
but debtor did not attempt to do so).
209 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(2) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 50, at 849.
210 See, e.g., N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers,
Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that duty to meet at reasonable times is satisfied when debtor
meets with union for ten hours total under the circumstances of the case); In re Ky. Truck Sales Inc., 52 B.R.
797, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (four meetings between debtor and union sufficient); Am. Provision Co., 44
B.R. at 910–11 (insufficient when debtor only meets once with union and declines requests to meet further).
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1. Richard Mellow Electrical Contractors Corp.211
In Richard Mellow, an electrical contracting company and its union, the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 81, were scheduled to
begin negotiations on a new collective bargaining agreement shortly before the
existing one lapsed.212 The union attempted to start the negotiations by mailing
the employer an initial proposal and suggesting several potential meeting
times.213 The parties held a brief meeting a month later and the employer
promised to “get back” to the union shortly about scheduling another
meeting.214 The employer did not get back to the union as promised, and
ignored two voicemails from union representatives attempting to schedule
meetings.215
The employer finally submitted a proposal to the union three months later
and the parties met again two months after the proposal was submitted.216
During this meeting, the parties were unable to make significant progress.217
The union subsequently proposed three possible future meeting times and the
employer declined all three, telling the union it would “get back to [it] to set up
a meeting sometime in the next two weeks,” but never did.218 The NLRB ruled
the employer’s actions “clearly fall far short of its obligation to meet at
reasonable times and to bargain with the [u]nion,” and held the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice.219

211

Richard Mellow Elec. Contractors Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1999).
Id. at 1115. Relations between the two parties had been contentious from the start. When the union
first organized, the employer resisted the organizing campaign strongly enough that the union filed unfair labor
practice charges as a result of the employer’s actions. Id. at 1112. The parties ultimately settled, but not
without the employer admitting guilt in “interrogating employees about their union activities . . . threaten[ing]
to reclassify employees as apprentices, [threatening to] close its shop and reopen under a new name with new
employees; creating the impression of surveillance; promising benefits; announcing new benefits; and granting
a wage increase to discourage employees from voting for union representation.” Id.
213 Id. at 1115.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1116.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
212
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2. Caribe Staple Co.220
In Caribe Staple Co., the employer was an Illinois based corporation that
manufactured staples at a factory in Puerto Rico.221 After its factory workers
joined Union General De Trabajadores De Puerto Rico in October 1991, the
union initiated collective bargaining negotiations and the parties traded
proposals via mail through the end of January 1992.222 The parties also agreed
to meet for three days at the end of March for face-to-face negotiations, but
when the employer’s representatives arrived in Puerto Rico they announced
that they were unable to meet on the third scheduled day.223
After the March meetings, the employer only agreed to meet with the union
three more times before cutting off negotiations.224 The union requested
meetings in April, June, and September, but the employer delayed each
proposed meeting by a few weeks, causing the parties to meet at a later date
every time.225 The employer refused to schedule more than three consecutive
days of meetings during each session and capped daily meetings at four hours
and fifteen minutes.226 Further, at each set of meetings the employer found
reasons to meet for less time than the parties had originally agreed upon.227
The NLRB ruled the employer did not satisfy its duty to meet with the
union at reasonable times, noting that “considerations of personal convenience,
including geographic or professional conflicts, do not take precedence over the
statutory demand that the bargaining process take place with expedition and
regularity.”228 The NLRB held that four trips by company management from
Chicago to Puerto Rico for negotiating sessions, none of which exceeded three
days in duration or four hours and fifteen minutes per session, evidenced “clear
noncompliance with a duty to meet at reasonable times.”229

220

Caribe Staple Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 877 (1994).
Id. at 879.
222 Id. at 888.
223 Id. at 891.
224 Id. at 891–93.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 890–92.
227 Id. at 891–92. In May, the employer cancelled the last two days of meetings in response to union
vandalism of employer property. Id. In July, the employer reduced the scheduled meeting times on the last two
days of talks, and in October, the employer walked out on the third day of negotiations in protest over an
unwanted representative the union brought. Id.
228 Id. at 893.
229 Id.
221
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3. Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB230
In Sparks Nugget, the employer and the union representing its employees,
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, Local 86,
AFL-CIO, were unable to reach a collective bargaining agreement, and as a
consequence the union filed unfair labor practice charges against the
employer.231 Chief among these charges was that the employer would not meet
with the union at “reasonable times.”232 The union had requested that the
parties negotiate in the first place, and asked that the sides meet “regularly and
often” to get a deal done.233 The employer, however, would only agree to
“short, intermittent bargaining sessions” because its managers were
“businessmen, and they have to take care of business.”234 When the union
offered to work around the employer’s schedule so that more regular and
lengthier meetings could be scheduled, the employer refused.235
The NLRB ruled the employer’s actions did not comply with the
requirement to meet at reasonable times, and the Ninth Circuit upheld that
ruling.236 Both the NLRB and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the employer’s
position that its “managers were businessmen, and they had to take care of
business” confirmed that the employer was not meeting at reasonable times
with its union, because such a statement evinced that “bargaining was not part
of its business, but rather something to be fit in at odd moments, without regard
to whether significant progress toward reaching agreement could be made by
proceeding in this manner.”237
4. Additional Decisions Relating to the Duty to Meet at Reasonable Times
Beyond the behaviors condemned in the above cases, courts have found
that several other negotiating behaviors violate the duty to meet at reasonable
times. For example, employers can breach this duty when they refuse to meet

230

Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 993.
232 Id. at 993–94.
233 Id. at 992.
234 Id. at 992–93 (citation omitted).
235 Id. at 993.
236 Id. at 995; see also Rhodes St. Clair Buick, 242 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1323 (1979) (finding failure to meet at
reasonable times when the union continually requests that the parties negotiate more frequently and for longer
periods, but the employer refuses).
237 Sparks Nugget, Inc., 968 F.2d at 995 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
231
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unless a federal mediator is present,238 refuse to meet for two months after the
union formed,239 require the union to submit all proposals in writing while
refusing to meet face to face,240 or insist on negotiating exclusively through
mailed letters over union objections.241 Each of these cases demonstrates the
fact-specific inquiries that courts and the NLRB regularly conduct to determine
whether employers have satisfied their duty to meet at reasonable times.
D. Surface Bargaining
Surface bargaining occurs when “forms of negotiation have been employed
to conceal a purpose to frustrate or avoid mutual agreement.”242 Even if the
employer meets with the union regularly and at length, unlawful surface
bargaining exists if it is “merely going through the motions of bargaining.”243
While surface bargaining is conceptually simple to understand, it can be
difficult to identify in practice. The NLRB and courts must examine the
“totality” of a party’s words and actions to determine if “the party is engaging
in hard but lawful bargaining to achieve a contract that it considers desirable or
is unlawfully endeavoring to frustrate the possibility of arriving at any
agreement.”244 Only the latter behavior is surface bargaining.
In Atlanta Hilton & Tower,245 the NLRB identified several behaviors
constituting surface bargaining, including “delaying tactics, unreasonable
bargaining demands, unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining,
efforts to bypass the union, failure to designate an agent with sufficient
238 Riverside Cement Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 815, 818–19 (1991) (finding that the duty to meet with the union
at reasonable times is “wholly independent of the willingness of any mediator to participate”).
239 Rhodes St. Clair Buick, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1323.
240 NLRB v. U.S. Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1953).
241 NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1941); see also Alle Arecibo Corp., 264
N.L.R.B. 1267, 1273 (1982) (noting that employer’s insistence on negotiating through mailed letters and
phone calls reflects a “callous unwillingness” to satisfy its duty to meet with the union at reasonable times).
242 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864; see also NLRB v. Whittier Mills, Co., 111
F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1940) (stating that “willful obstruction of” and “purpose to defeat” collective
bargaining negotiations constitutes surface bargaining).
243 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864 (citing Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d
795 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Maywood Do-nut Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 529, 537 (1980) (holding that surface
bargaining exists where employer evinces attitude of not taking the negotiations seriously, refuses to send any
company personnel to bargaining sessions or to make any counterproposals, and hesitates to schedule
meetings).
244 Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 334 N.L.R.B. 487, 487 (2001), enforced, 318 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2003); see
also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864–65.
245 Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603 (1984).
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bargaining authority, withdrawal of already agreed-upon provisions, and
arbitrary scheduling of meetings.”246 While court oversight required by § 1113
would preclude debtors from engaging in several of these behaviors, three in
particular—delaying tactics, unreasonable bargaining demands, and
withdrawal of already agreed upon provisions—would prove appealing to
debtors if courts were to limit the terms they can impose when pre-§ 1113
negotiations fail to yield an agreement.247
1. Delaying Tactics
In Regency Service Carts,248 the NLRB affirmed the ruling of an
administrative judge finding that a manufacturer of hotel and restaurant
equipment had engaged in surface bargaining with the union representing its
employees, Shopmen’s Local Union Number 455, International Association of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO.249 The parties
bargained for thirty-two months without reaching agreement, and it was clear
that this was the employer’s intended result.250
Throughout the entire process, the employer strenuously resisted
scheduling meetings.251 When the union made several attempts over a three-

246 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 865–66 (quoting Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271
N.L.R.B. at 1603). Beyond the behaviors listed in Atlanta Hilton & Tower, the NLRB has identified other
behaviors constituting surface bargaining that employers would be incentivized to mimic if courts do not
provide them flexibility in imposing terms on the union after court approval of § 1113 rejection. 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 866–67; see, e.g., NLRB v. Wright Motors, Inc., 603 F.2d 604,
606–10 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that employer who makes predictably unacceptable proposals and refuses to
consider alternatives engages in surface bargaining); Neon Sign Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 861, 862–63 (1977)
(finding that surface bargaining exists where an employer rejects a union proposal, and makes a
counterproposal but does not try to reconcile the differences between the two).
247 These behaviors would not be tempting for debtors if they had flexibility to impose terms from any
pre-§ 1113 proposal, because then they could negotiate with the purpose of making a deal, instead of with the
purpose of hedging against the possibility of imposing concessionary terms that they do not want to impose if
negotiations fail. The next section of this Comment focuses on behaviors such as those in Atlanta Hilton, that
are plausible under the requirements of § 1113, but there are many behaviors that courts and the NLRB have
found to constitute surface bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir.
1963) (unilateral changes in mandatory bargaining subjects); Fairhaven Props., 314 N.L.R.B. 763, 770 (1994)
(employer tries to bypass union by making direct offer to employees on condition that they oust union);
Billups W. Petroleum Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 964, 973 (1968) (employer fails to designate bargaining agent with
sufficient authority).
248 Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 671 (2005).
249 Id. at 677.
250 Id. at 672.
251 Id. at 716.
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month span to begin negotiations, the employer ignored each attempt before
finally agreeing to meet.252 After the initial meeting, the parties were scheduled
to meet twenty-eight more times over a two and a half year span.253 Despite
this plan, the employer continually rejected the union’s proposed meeting
dates, insisting instead on dates falling after the union’s final proposed date.254
The NLRB found that the irregularity of the meetings was due to the
employer’s refusal to make itself available, despite the union “consistently
pressing for more frequent meetings.”255
Beyond irregularly scheduled meetings, the employer utilized several other
delaying tactics. When the union requested information about the employer’s
proposals, the employer would stall.256 Of the twenty-nine total bargaining
sessions, the employer canceled eight, and did not show up for the final one.257
When bargaining sessions did occur, the employer limited them to three
hours.258 Furthermore, sessions were often shortened or interrupted by the
employer’s habit of arriving late, taking phone calls during meetings, and
ending meetings early even when the union desired to continue negotiating.259
The NLRB cited these “dilatory tactics” as proof that the employer engaged
in surface bargaining.260 The NLRB stated that the “totality of the
[employer’s] . . . conduct demonstrates that it intended to frustrate negotiations
and prevent the successful negotiation of a bargaining agreement.”261
2. Unreasonable Bargaining Demands
In NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches,262 a company that produced
sandwiches and pies for distribution to convenience stores engaged in
contentious collective bargaining negotiations with the Hotel, Motel,
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local Number 737 that

252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 727 (quoting Mid-Continent Concrete, 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 261 (2001)).
NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1984).
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represented its production and maintenance employees.263 After eighteen
bargaining sessions in eleven months, the parties came to an agreement on a
handful of minor issues, but were unable to reach agreement on six core
issues.264 The union filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging that the
employer’s bargaining positions on those six core issues, combined with its
frequent practice of responding to union complaints about its proposals by
making even broader proposals, constituted surface bargaining.265
When the case reached the Eleventh Circuit, the court sided with the union.
It held that the employer’s unreasonable demands and desire for “unilateral
control over virtually all significant terms and conditions of employment”
evinced surface bargaining from the employer with “little desire to work
towards agreement of a contract.”266
3. Withdrawal of Already Agreed Upon Provisions
In Valley Oil Co.,267 the employer, an oil and gasoline distributor, held
sixteen bargaining sessions over four months with the union representing its
truck drivers, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local
Number 437, but the parties were unable to reach a collective bargaining
agreement.268 When negotiations began, the parties agreed on a handful of
issues quickly.269 After agreeing to these terms, however, the employer
263

Id. at 873.
Id.
265 Id. The six core issues that the union referred to were: (1) the employer’s demand of exclusive
authority over all wage decisions; (2) the employer’s proposed extraordinarily broad “management rights”
clause “which reserved exclusively . . . all authority customarily exercised by Management and ‘each and
every right, power and privilege that it had ever enjoyed, whether exercised or not . . . ’”; (3) the employer’s
proposed “zipper clause” where “the parties [waived the] right to bargain during the life of the agreement
regarding any subject or any matter referred to or covered in the agreement or any other subject matter which
could be considered a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining”; (4) the employer’s proposed “no-strike
clause” that prohibited the union from striking for either economic or unfair labor practice reasons; (5) the
employer’s desire to retain uninhibited control over all disciplinary matters; and (6) the employer’s demand for
full discretion over laying off and recalling employees based on productivity instead of seniority. Id.
266 Id. at 877; see also Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. NLRB, 318 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 2003);
Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that surface bargaining exists where
employer’s proposals included cuts to wages, holiday pay, and vacation pay, eliminated the pension plan,
swapped the employer’s insurance plan for the union insurance plan, and made it easy to fire employees);
Liquor Indus. Bargaining Grp. & Fedway Assocs., 333 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (2002); Burrows Paper Corp.,
332 N.L.R.B. 82, 93–94 (2000).
267 Valley Oil Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 370 (1974).
268 Id. at 373, 383.
269 Id. at 383.
264
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changed bargaining representatives, and then withdrew many of the previously
agreed upon provisions.270 When the employer reneged on these terms and the
parties held ten additional meetings without reaching an agreement, the union
went on strike and remained on strike while the NLRB considered unfair labor
practice charges against the employer.271
The NLRB found that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by
engaging in surface bargaining primarily due to its widespread withdrawal
from agreements already reached with the union.272 The NLRB determined that
such conduct “frustrat[ed] arrival at a contract” and “the conclusion [was]
inescapable that the bargaining before the strike occurred was not good faith
bargaining.”273 Once the union went on strike, the employer made a new
proposal that included different proposed wage terms because it viewed the
strike as “a rejection of its earlier offers.”274 The NLRB found that this
“bargaining posture [was] designed to frustrate collective bargaining, rather
than legitimate hard bargaining.”275
E. Limiting the Terms Debtors May Impose to Their “Last, Best Offer”
Discourages Bargaining in Good Faith and Meeting at Reasonable Times
While Encouraging Unlawful Surface Bargaining
If courts limit debtors’ ability to impose labor terms to only those found in
their “last, best offer” at the time pre-§ 1113 negotiations fail, they will be
disincentivized from negotiating in good faith and meeting at reasonable times
with their unions, and instead will be incentivized to engage in unlawful
surface bargaining. While bargaining in good faith and meeting at reasonable
times are obligatory under the NLRA, debtors will likely fear that satisfying
both requirements while failing to reach an agreement will mean being forced
to impose concessionary labor terms post-§ 1113. In the debtor’s mind, this
scenario may have worse ramifications than the alternatives of surface
270 Id. at 383–84. The employer reneged on the agreement covering wages much later than the other
terms, after ten bargaining sessions had failed to yield an agreement and after the union went on strike. The
employer’s new proposal for wages, which the union promptly rejected, included 3% increases across the
board, along with the creation of new job classifications that further delineated salaries for employees based on
whether they had three years of experience or not. Id. at 384.
271 Id. at 383.
272 Id. at 385.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 385–86.
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bargaining or daring the union to file expensive, slow moving, unfair labor
practice charges that may or may not result in liability for the employer.276
Limiting debtors’ to imposing only labor terms from their “last, best offer”
if negotiations fail would create a detrimental but powerful incentive for
debtors to surface bargain as a means of protecting themselves. Surface
bargaining does not benefit the union who, regardless of the debtor’s true
intentions, must continue negotiating, nor does it benefit the debtor, who must
spend time and money to put up a façade of genuine negotiations to satisfy the
requirements of § 1113(b)(2).277 Debtors will likely view the time and expense
of surface bargaining as less costly than the possibility of being forced to
impose concessionary labor terms after genuinely attempting, but failing, to
reach an agreement.
By contrast, if courts allow debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113
proposal, incentives for debtors would be properly aligned with the
requirements of the NLRA. Such flexibility would incentivize debtors to
bargain in good faith and meet at reasonable times, while discouraging surface
bargaining because debtors would know that if negotiations fail, they will not
regret genuinely attempting to reach an agreement as they would if forced to
impose labor terms only from their “last, best offer.” Thus, if negotiations fail
and courts give debtors flexibility to impose any labor term from any pre§ 1113 proposal, incentives for debtors will be properly aligned with desired
behaviors under § 1113 and the NLRA.
IV. UNDER THE TWO PRINCIPAL MODELS OF NEGOTIATION, THE PARTIES ARE
MORE LIKELY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IF COURTS ALLOW THE DEBTOR TO
IMPOSE TERMS FROM ANY PRE-§ 1113 PROPOSALS
If courts permit post-§ 1113 debtors flexibility to impose labor terms from
any pre-§ 1113 proposal, the parties will be more likely, under the two most
widely followed theoretical models of negotiation, to reach an agreement.
Under both the economic model and the problem-solving model of negotiation,
276 In addition to uncertainty about whether liability would attach, this scenario would also preserve the
debtor’s ability to impose preferred labor terms if negotiations fail. Meeting the requirements of the NLRA, by
contrast, would likely entail the debtor being forced to impose concessionary and undesired labor terms that
may be included in a “last, best offer” if the parties cannot reach agreement.
277 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(2) (2012) (requiring debtor to negotiate with union in good faith between
the initial modified collective bargaining agreement proposal and when the § 1113 petition for rejection is
made).

KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

3/5/2014 9:08 AM

CONSIDERING LABOR TERMS

249

if courts permit flexibility in the terms the debtor may impose should
bargaining fail, the debtor will be more likely to function like a rational actor
trying earnestly to reach an agreement, because it will not have to fear the
repercussions if negotiations fail. Similarly, unions will also feel more urgency
to act rationally to reach an agreement because if none is reached, its members
will be stuck working under labor terms that the debtor may impose from any
point in the negotiations, with little union input required.
On the contrary, if the parties must negotiate knowing that only terms from
the “last, best offer” may be imposed if an agreement is not reached, debtors
will function irrationally under both models by not trying sincerely to reach a
deal, and making few, if any, concessions. Unions may also act irrationally,
withholding offers and concessions in the hopes that the debtor will bargain
against itself, and ultimately impose favorable “last, best offer” terms when it
faces no alternative. Thus, because parties to most negotiations will follow one
of these two models, it is logical for courts to permit post-§ 1113 debtors to
impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal because it maximizes the chances
of the parties acting rationally and reaching an agreement.
A. The Economic Model of Negotiation
The economic model of negotiation treats bargaining “as a process of
convergence over time involving a sequence of offers and counteroffers on the
part of the participants.”278 Under the economic theory, each negotiation can be
broken down into individual issues, and each issue can be visualized on a
continuum, with extremes at each end of the continuum representing the
optimal position for one party involved in the negotiations.279
Each party makes a decision about where along the continuum it will begin
negotiating, and makes an opening offer to the opposing party based on that
decision.280 Parties typically base their opening offers on three key factors: “(1)

278

ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING:
SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 358 (1990) (quoting BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF
NEGOTIATION 131–32 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975)).
279 THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & PAUL J. ZWIER, ADVANCED NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION THEORY AND
PRACTICE 2 (Anthony J. Bocchino et al. eds., 2005). According to the economic theory of negotiation, each
separate issue represents a “bilateral monopoly,” or a scenario where the two parties must “come to the
specific terms of exchange between themselves” or else the comprehensive deal they are negotiating will not
be consummated. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 357.
280 GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 2.
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a rank ordering of preferences among payoff outcomes; (2) a schedule of costs
during the time when the parties are bargaining . . . and (3) an estimate of the
opponent’s concession pattern over the course of negotiations.”281 Combining
these factors with the commonly accepted notion that “a tough opening
position will produce a better outcome for the tough bargainer’s side” enables
each party to come up with its “most efficient opening position.”282
As negotiations progress and the “sequence of offers and counteroffers”283
begins, the parties will each determine where along the continuum they are
comfortable moving and where along the continuum they will not move
beyond, called their “bottom line.”284 Parties follow the doctrine of
“convergence to settlement” in determining the frequency and magnitude of
concessions they are willing to make.285 Under this doctrine, the parties watch
each other’s behavior and concession rate, determining the best way to respond
based on whether the behavior was expected or surprising.286 If the opponent’s
behavior was as expected, the party sticks with its pre-negotiation concession
plan; however, if it was unexpected, the party changes its concession plan
based on “revised expectations” of the opposition’s behavior.287
The area on the continuum located between each party’s opening offer and
bottom line is commonly known as its “bargaining range.”288 When the parties’
bargaining ranges overlap, a “settlement zone” exists for the particular issue
indicating that a solution acceptable to each party can be reached through the
process of exchanging offers and counter offers.289 Each party decides whether
to accept or reject an offer within its settlement zone by evaluating a handful of
factors, including its “preferred outcome, the opponent’s current offer, and the

281 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 359 (citing BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF
NEGOTIATION, supra note 278, at 138).
282 Id. at 359–60.
283 Id. at 358.
284 GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 2.
285 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 360.
286 Id. (quoting BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 278, at 138).
287 Id. Generally, “if the other side concedes more slowly than he initially expected, the bargainer makes a
concession[;] if the other concedes more rapidly than he expected, [then the bargainer remains firm].” Id.
(alterations in original).
288 GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 3.
289 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 358–59. In fact, the economic theory assumes that “a
settlement zone exists within which each party is willing to agree. This settlement zone must be susceptible to
relatively precise identification and should remain more or less stable during the negotiation process.” Id. at
358.
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costs of deadlock.”290 The parties will not agree to a settlement until each
party’s “estimate of the actual risk of deadlock” equals the party’s risk
tolerance, causing both parties to accept the offer on the table.291
The economic model of negotiation is grounded in the idea of placing a
quantitative value on both tangible and intangible issues relevant to each
party.292 When functioning as envisioned, the economic model assumes that
the parties’ initial positions do not already fall within the settlement zone,
requiring each party to quickly determine before trading proposals both its own
bottom line and its estimate for that of the other party.293 Likewise, each party
must have “values and goals” that remain constant throughout the negotiation
so that it can identify which offers and counteroffers on a particular issue are
better or worse as the negotiations proceed.294
The economic model relies heavily on thorough planning and exchange of
accurate information before and during the bargaining process.295 Parties plot
out their negotiating strategies in advance and “anticipate the reactions of their
opponents.”296 With such a “premium” on information, each party must act as
a “rational decision mak[er]” in setting its bottom line and must assume that
the opposing party is doing the same.297 If the parties act irrationally, this
model will not function at maximum efficiency and will force the parties to
make unjustified concessions during the bargaining process.298
B. The Problem-Solving Model of Negotiation
The problem-solving model of negotiation requires the parties to identify
their own “needs, interests, and desires” in the negotiation, along with those of
the other party, while ignoring the “bargaining positions that often mask those
needs.”299 Problem-solvers bargain over their interests, as opposed to their
entrenched positions, and apply a highly collaborative approach to negotiations

290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. at 361.
Id.
GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 3.
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 359; GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 3.
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 358.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.; GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 3.
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 362.
Id. at 379; GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 4–5.
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that enables the parties to “jointly create . . . win/win solution[s].”300 Under this
model, the parties “advance proposals that invite opponents to accept, reject, or
modify based on how the proposals intersect with their interests, [and] . . .
explain why solutions are acceptable or unacceptable in whole or in part based
on” analyzing each party’s needs.301 When negotiations hit a wall, problemsolvers “seldom make concessions . . . but instead shift to another proposal that
more completely addresses the parties’ mutual problems.”302
Attempting to reconcile interests rather than bargaining positions is a good
negotiating strategy for two reasons. First, there are typically multiple
positions that could satisfy a stated interest, and although the parties in most
negotiations simply adopt the most obvious position that fulfills the interest,
there are often alternative positions that better meet the interests of both
parties.303 Second, working to reconcile positions instead of compromising
between them allows the parties to uncover “shared and compatible interests”
that “present opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and better
quality solutions.”304 Generally, reconciling interests “offers the possibility of
meeting a greater variety of needs both directly and by trading off different
needs, rather than forcing a zero-sum battle over a single issue.”305
Once the parties have identified each other’s needs and interests, and
attempted to reconcile those interests, they then work collaboratively to create
mutually beneficial solutions. Any such solution must “satisfy the parties’
needs and interests, to achieve a result that the parties recognize as more
advantageous to themselves and each other than the available alternatives.”306
300

GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 4–5.
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 383.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 379 (quoting ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 42–43 (1981)).
304 Id. at 379 (quoting FISHER & URY, supra note 303, at 42–43).
305 Id. at 379 (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure
of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754, 795 (1984)). In fact, Menkel-Meadow goes on to say:
301

[The] principle underlying such an approach is that unearthing a greater number of the actual
needs of the parties will create more possible solutions because not all needs will be mutually
exclusive . . . because not all individuals value the same things the same way, the exploitation of
differential or complementary needs will produce a wider variety of solutions which more closely
meet the parties’ needs.
Id. at 379–80.
306 Id. at 381. When searching for mutually beneficial solutions, parties must be careful to avoid the “four
obstacles to invention of multiple options for mutual gain.” Id. (citing FISHER & URY, supra note 303, at 59).
Those obstacles are: “[p]remature judgment that stifles imagination, searching for a single solution, the
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By creating a more conciliatory and cooperative negotiating environment
emphasizing reciprocal sharing of the parties’ underlying needs, creative
solutions can be mutually developed that make each party happy and better
preserve the long-term relationship between each side.307
The risks associated with the problem-solving approach, however, are
significant. Foremost among them is the potential for a breach of trust by one
party once it has elicited the desired information.308 A party’s needs, interests,
and desires must be shared for the problem-solving approach to function, but if
the opposing party adopts a more adversarial approach mid-stream, “there is a
real risk . . . that the problem-solver will reveal information valuable to the
other side in assessment of the problem-solver’s vulnerabilities without
correspondingly gaining information about vulnerabilities on the other side.”309
This risk requires parties to ask themselves if “bargainers [will] be able to set
aside selfish concerns and bargain . . . altruistically, for the long-term good of
their opponent,” or instead, if they will “only fake these more altruistic
concerns in order to position themselves to take advantage of the other”
party.310 If a party does not trust its opposition enough to believe it will choose
the former, then it should adopt a more adversarial negotiating style in lieu of
using the problem-solving approach for the negotiations at hand.311
C. Under Either Model, the Parties Are More Likely to Reach an Agreement if
Courts Permit Latitude in the Terms Employers May Impose if Bargaining
Fails
During the bargaining that follows the economic model of negotiation,
parties never change the particular topic being negotiated, and as negotiations
proceed, they “shift and alter their outcome preferences along the bargaining
continuum” for that topic until reaching either an agreement or deadlock.312 By
contrast, during a negotiation under the problem-solving model, the parties

assumption of a fixed resource pie, and thinking that opponents are responsible for solving their own
problems.” Id. On the rare occasion when parties demand only “the same material item . . . problem-solvers
resist doing so in the first instance, exploring sharing or substituting solutions before succumbing to the
division compromise.” Id. at 382.
307 GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 5, 8.
308 Id. at 8.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 9.
311 See id.
312 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 383.
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keep their “value preferences constant and shift among and between proposed
combinations of resources until a solution that satisfies mutual needs
emerges.”313 While the methodological underpinnings of each model vary
widely, as applied in the § 1113 setting each model is more likely to produce
an agreement between the parties if courts permit the debtor to broadly impose
labor terms from any pre-§ 1113 offer, including its initial proposal.
1. Economic Model of Negotiation
Under the economic model, the parties each stake out positions on
individual issues along a continuum and make concessionary offers and
counteroffers along that continuum until both have arrived in a mutually
agreeable “settlement zone.”314 If the debtor fears that it will be stuck imposing
all of the concessionary terms it offers if negotiations fall apart, it will be
hesitant to make meaningful concessions or substantial moves along the
continuum, reducing the chances of an agreement. Likewise, the union will
also not be interested in making concessionary moves along its continuum
because it will not want to bargain against itself.
For the economic model to function, each party must try to anticipate the
movements along the continuum that the other party will make, and each party
must act rationally in making these movements.315 If either party is hesitant to
make meaningful concessions or moves along its continuum regardless of the
movements of the other party, it will upset the requirement of rational action,
and will make it unlikely that the parties ever reach the settlement zone.
By contrast, if courts permit the debtor to impose terms from any of its pre§ 1113 proposals, the debtor will be free to make concessions and move along
its continuum in an effort to reach an agreement without fearing the
repercussions should the negotiations fail. The union will similarly be willing
to move along its continuum with the debtor doing the same, and will be
motivated to reach a deal to avert the possibility of the debtor having broad
authority to unilaterally impose labor terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal.
Thus, if courts allow debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal, it
will encourage both parties to act rationally and make concessions, which the
economic model requires, and will raise the likelihood of an agreement.
313
314
315

Id.
Id. at 358.
GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 3.
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2. Problem-Solving Model of Negotiation
Parties operating under the problem-solving model are also more likely to
reach an agreement if courts permit the debtor to impose terms from any pre§ 1113 proposal should the parties fail to reach an agreement. Under the
problem-solving model, parties are required to freely exchange information
about their needs, interests, and desires in an effort to reach a mutually
beneficial solution.316 This approach requires a high level of altruistic
collaboration, and similarly requires that the parties trust one another implicitly
to not misuse the otherwise private information being exchanged.317
If courts limit post-§ 1113 debtors to imposing terms only from their “last,
best offer,” both parties would have a strong incentive to avoid the cooperative
negotiations that the problem-solving model requires. Debtors may fear the
repercussions if the parties do not make a deal, and will have greater incentive
to withhold “mutually beneficial” solutions that could benefit the union more
than the employer should negotiations fail. The union would be similarly
hesitant to offer a variety of solutions as required by the problem-solving
model if the debtor refuses to do the same. Further, the debtor will be
incentivized to take any private information the union offers regarding what its
true needs, interests, and desires are, and use it to limit its own offers should it
realize that those needs, interests, and desires are not compatible with its own.
Having a similar incentive, the union will surely be aware of this incentive for
the debtor and will likely respond by offering little private information as well.
By contrast, if post-§ 1113 debtors have broader authority to impose terms
from any pre-§ 1113 proposal, should negotiations fail, each party will be more
likely to collaborate in order to find a mutually beneficial solution. Debtors
will have no reason to withhold information or ideas that may work for both
parties, because should negotiations fall apart, they will not be penalized for
making the proposals in the first place. Similarly, unions will have no reason to
withhold information or potential solutions because they will be motivated to
reach a deal that precludes the debtor from unilaterally imposing the labor
terms of its choice from any pre-§ 1113 proposal. Likewise, neither party
would have incentive to misuse information provided by the other, because the
focus of the negotiations will be on making a deal as opposed to limiting offers
in the event that the parties’ needs, interests, and desires are not compatible.
316
317

Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
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CONCLUSION
Courts should give debtors flexibility to impose labor terms from any pre§ 1113 proposal. This approach would create a consistent standard for the
nonbankruptcy bargain to impasse scenario and the analogous post-§ 1113
bankruptcy scenario. Flexibility in imposing terms would also encourage
debtors to satisfy the NLRA and § 1113 requirements of bargaining in good
faith and meeting with the union at reasonable times, and would discourage
unlawful and undesirable behaviors such as surface bargaining. In addition,
this approach would increase the likelihood of the parties reaching an
agreement under the two primary models of negotiation, which is an objective
that Congress intended to encourage in passing § 1113.318
If courts limit debtors’ ability to impose labor terms to only those found in the
“last, best offer,” debtors, unions, and bankruptcy courts will all lose. Debtors
and unions will be less likely to reach mutual agreements and each will be
incentivized to hedge against undesirable, worst case scenarios instead of to
negotiate earnestly towards an agreement. Courts will be forced to apply
inconsistent standards to cases in analogous bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
scenarios and, with the parties less likely to reach agreements on their own,
courts will be further bogged down with lengthy bankruptcy proceedings.
Thus, for the benefit of debtors, unions, and the court system, courts, and in
particular appellate courts whose opinions create precedent, and district courts
whose circuits lack precedent, should permit debtors to impose terms broadly
from any pre-§ 1113 proposal if negotiations fail.
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collective bargaining agreement, instead of forcing courts to do the leg-work).
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